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Cooperative arrangements, such as partnering, have received increased interest in recent years. Several studies
show however that cooperative relationships are not easily achieved in construction. Implementation of
cooperative relationships requires changes in several elements of the traditional procurement procedures. The
purpose of this paper is therefore to propose and test a sequential model regarding clients’ cooperative
procurement procedures. We especially ask: what elements in clients’ procurement procedures facilitate the
establishment of cooperation and trust in their relationships with contractors? The model was tested through
structural equation modelling. The empirical data required for the test were collected through a survey
responded to by 87 Swedish professional construction clients. The empirical results show that cooperative
procurement procedures are triggered by clients’ wish to involve contractors early in specification, which has a
simultaneous effect on procedures regarding bid invitation and compensation. Furthermore, these
simultaneous effects breed a certain kind of partner selection based on task-related attributes, which also has
a direct positive effect on trust and above all on cooperation in client–contractor relationships. Besides these
implications from the model, the improvement of measurements for future modelling is discussed.
Keywords: Cooperation, partnering, procurement, SEM
Introduction
In recent years increased interest in cooperative
arrangements, such as partnering, has been noticeable
in the construction industry as a result of escalating
conflicts and adversarial client–contractor relationships
(Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Ng et al., 2002; Chan et
al., 2003). The increased need for cooperation also
stems from the increased complexity, uncertainty and
time pressure that characterize construction projects
(Gidado, 1996; Pietroforte, 1997). These character-
istics require relation-specific investments, knowledge
sharing, flexibility and integration, which are facilitated
in long-term cooperative relationships (Pietroforte,
1997; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002).
Partnering, aiming at increasing cooperation and
integration between the involved actors by building
trust and commitment and decreasing disputes, can
bring about advantages regarding quality, safety per-
formance, sustainability, dispute resolution, human
resource management, innovation, and also time and
cost reductions (Barlow et al., 1997; Egan, 1998; Chan
et al., 2003). Implementing cooperative relationships is
however not an easy and straightforward task (Saad
et al., 2002; Chan et al., 2003); it should therefore be
done in a proper way and for the proper reasons in
suitable projects (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Ng et
al., 2002). In their empirical studies of the implemen-
tation of cooperation in construction supply chains,
Akintoye et al. (2000) and Saad et al. (2002) found that
cooperation was conceived to be important and
beneficial. However, they also found that a lack of
understanding of the concept and its prerequisites
hindered successful implementation.
Procurement determines responsibilities and autho-
rities in the construction process (Love et al., 1998) and
affects the degree of cooperation and integration
between the participants (Briscoe et al., 2004). To
facilitate cooperative relationships many elements of
the traditional procurement procedures thus need to be
changed. With this in mind, it seems relevant to
increase the understanding of partnering implementa-
tion through cooperative procurement procedures (i.e.
procurement procedures that facilitate cooperation).
The purpose of this paper is therefore to propose
and test a sequential model of clients’ cooperative*Author for correspondence. E-mail: pererik.eriksson@ltu.se
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procurement procedures. We especially ask: what
elements in clients’ procurement procedures facilitate
the establishment of cooperation and trust in their
relationships with contractors? The model is tested
through a structural equation modelling technique,
based on empirical survey data from 87 Swedish
professional construction clients. Apart from this unique
empirical dataset, the paper offers (1) a model of how
cooperation is formed through clients’ procurement
procedures; (2) how individual measures are linked to
one another; and (3) a report on how well the individual
measurements work in the context of construction.
Cooperative procurement procedures
According to Korczynski (1996), there are two main
ways for the client side (including management
contractors) to manage the relationships with construc-
tion actors: the competitive low-trust route and the
cooperative high-trust route. These two routes start
with the way of handling specification and affect the
entire procurement process. The competitive route,
which is traditional in construction (Kadefors, 2004), is
based on a comprehensive and fixed design, seeking to
gain short-term profits by passing on risks and
pressuring contractors to lower their prices
(Korczynski, 1996). Hence, this fixed design approach
is mostly coupled with fixed price compensation. This
traditional procurement paradigm receives criticism for
hindering contractor input regarding planning and
technical solutions, which hampers innovation and
buildability (Korczynski, 1996; Dubois and Gadde,
2002). Furthermore, it makes parallel design and
construction impossible, leading to longer project
duration (Cheung et al., 2001). Hence, it seems
important that a new stream of cooperative procure-
ment procedures emerges. Such a cooperative route
seeks to obtain long-term gains through increased
cooperation and integration of design and construction,
through early involvement of contractors (Korczynski,
1996).
We argue that complex, uncertain and more custo-
mized construction solutions require the procurement
procedures to become more negotiable in nature
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Cheng and Li, 2002;
Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Increased integra-
tion and cooperation between the actors through early
involvement of contractors in specification is thus
suitable in order to achieve efficient and value-adding
solutions (Korczynski, 1996; Barlow et al., 1997;
Briscoe et al., 2004). Such integration of design and
construction affects procurement procedures and
cooperation throughout the entire project. This is
because it becomes important to establish a trust-based
cooperative relationship in order to facilitate contrac-
tors’ contributions in the design stage (Korczynski,
1996). Cooperative procurement procedures therefore
demand a different kind of approach, involving more
joint specification together with incentive-based com-
pensation (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Love et al., 2004)
and limited invitation of contractors that are able to
meet and fulfil certain task-related attributes (Geringer,
1991; Love et al., 2004). All of these procurement
elements are assumed to increase trust and cooperation
in inter-organizational relationships (Korczynski, 1996;
Bayliss et al., 2004; Eriksson, 2006). In our depicted
model (see Figure 1), we therefore propose that clients’
desire to involve contractors early in specification
affects their choices regarding compensation, bid
invitation and task attributes, which further facilitates
trust and cooperation. In order to develop and test this
model, individual hypotheses connecting the different
elements of the overall process are required. Below,
these hypotheses are briefly discussed.
Specification effects on compensation and bid
invitation
Fixed price compensation is well suited to fixed and
comprehensive design (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
Figure 1 The model: cooperative procurement procedures
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However, this approach may cause win–lose profit
protection attitudes, which inhibit flexibility (Ng et al.,
2002) and discourage value-adding solutions. An
alternative approach is early involvement of contractors
in which the actors jointly specify both contract and
construction-related activities (Korczynski, 1996). This
early involvement is an effect of the many complex and
uncertain processes clients perceive in the beginning of
a new construction process. Since joint specification
requires a lot of time and effort, it is often coupled with
some kind of cost-plus (reimbursement) compensation
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001), which is motivation for the
activity to be prioritized. Reimbursement contracts are
occasionally coupled with cost incentives that reward
(or penalize) contractors for having actual costs below
(or above) a cost target (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
Such incentive-based compensation is important in
partnering arrangements so that all participating actors
can reap the benefits of increased cooperation and
integration between design and construction (Egan,
1998; Bayliss et al., 2004; Love et al., 2004).
Hypothesis 1: Early contractor involvement in specifica-
tion has a significant effect on incentive-based compen-
sation.
Additionally, joint specification requires close rela-
tionships and a long-term focus (Grandori, 1997),
since relation-specific investments are needed
(Williamson, 1985). Thus, specification is also related
to bid invitation procedures. For cooperation to
emerge, continuance is of the essence (Heide and
John, 1990), which can only be obtained when the
buyer utilizes a small pool of potential vendors who are
regularly used as suppliers (Spekman, 1988). The
constant replacement of actors between construction
projects creates cost inefficiencies in the traditional
competitive procurement route, since a new learning
curve must be climbed by the supplier each time (Cox
and Thompson, 1997) and because it discourages
relation-specific investments. Love et al. (2004) there-
fore argue that when integration of design and
construction is desired, contractors who have pre-
viously worked with the design participants should be
selected. By using the same project team members, a
partnering culture based on cooperation and teamwork
can emerge (Love et al., 2004). In order to enhance a
long-term perspective on contractors’ involvement and
contributions in joint specification, professional clients
should therefore utilize a small number of suppliers
contracted on a regular basis, which is facilitated by
limited bid invitations (Eriksson, 2006).
Hypothesis 2: Early contractor involvement in spe-
cification has a significant effect on limited bid
invitation.
Compensation and invitation effects on task-
related attributes
When purchasing standard products based on price,
the client does not take the opportunity to influence the
characteristics of the supplier, since these are consid-
ered less important (Heide and John, 1990). Such
price-based bid evaluation coupled with fixed price
compensation is traditional in construction. However,
when incentive-based compensation is chosen, in order
to motivate the contractor to contribute to value-
adding design solutions, the initial bid price is of less
importance than the characteristics of the contractor.
Cooperative procurement procedures therefore contain
an element in which the client evaluates the contrac-
tor’s ability to perform crucial tasks. Such an evaluation
of what Geringer (1991) calls task-related attributes is a
complex and time-consuming effort. It requires a broad
base of information ranging from earlier experiences,
quality and environmental management systems, finan-
cial record, a change of attitude, references, cooperative
and technical skills (Spekman, 1988; Parkhe, 1998).
When clients initiate relational contracting, involving
joint specification and incentive-based compensation,
such a partner selection based on task-related attributes
should be performed (Rahman and Kumaraswamy,
2002; Love et al., 2004).
Hypothesis 3: Incentive-based compensation has a
significant effect on task-related attributes.
When clients decide to invite a limited number of
contractors to bid, they lose short-term price focus
(Eriksson, 2006) and gain long-term benefits, by
increasing the opportunities for continuous learning
and relation-specific investments. Then it is important
to ensure that contractors are trustworthy and able to
contribute to better construction solutions (i.e.
increased buildability), in order to reap the benefits
from closer ties (Brown et al., 2001; Love et al., 2004).
Thus, when only a few bidders are invited, it is
important to perform a partner selection based on
task-related attributes.
Hypothesis 4: Limited bid invitation has a significant
effect on task-related attributes.
Task attributes’ effects on trust and cooperation
A key aspect of cooperative relationships is joint actions
that the partners perform together (Heide and John,
1990). In a construction context, establishment of joint
objectives, team-building activities, shared information,
shared office building and joint dispute resolution
techniques are joint actions that are considered
important aspects of partnering relationships (Barlow,
Procurement effects on cooperation 895
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2000; Cheung et al., 2003; Bayliss et al., 2004). To
facilitate this cooperation, the characteristics of the
partners are of importance. Careful partner selection,
based on task-related attributes, has therefore been
found to set a proper basis for cooperation to emerge
both in a general industry context (Heide and John,
1990; Stump and Heide, 1996) and in construction
(Brown et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 5: Task-related attributes have a significant
effect on cooperation.
Another beneficial effect of evaluation of task-related
attributes is trust, which is an important ingredient in
partnering arrangements (Korczynski, 1996; Cheng
and Li, 2002). Trust decreases the need for authority
and control, since the parties instead can build a
common organizational culture that encourages self-
control (Aulakh et al., 1996; Adler, 2001). When trust
is present, transaction parties believe that they can get
what they want from each other without the exercise of
authority and control (Ha˚kansson and Snehota, 1995).
Hence, trust has the role of decreasing traditional
monitoring and formal control that can create negative
feelings for the entity and increase the propensity for
opportunistic behaviour (Ghoshal and Moran, 1997).
In cooperative relationships, the buyer should therefore
trust the supplier to execute self-control of work in
progress and finished work (Hagen and Choe, 1998). A
key prerequisite for establishing this trust is knowledge
about the partner and behaviour predictability, which is
facilitated by careful partner selection based on task-
related attributes (Parkhe, 1998; Das and Teng, 2001).
Hypothesis 6: Task-related attributes have a significant
effect on trust.
Method
Sample
The data required for the test of our model was
collected through a survey. The sample consists of the
104 members of an association called The Swedish
Construction Client Forum, which has the objective of
promoting the interests of construction clients in
Sweden. The members are regional, national or
international industrial and property companies, muni-
cipalities and regional authorities, and also government
services and agencies, which procure construction work
regarding civil engineering, housing, industrial facil-
ities, etc. Hence, the Forum represents the majority of
professional construction clients in Sweden. Registered
contact persons in all of the member organizations were
first approached by e-mail or telephone in order to ask
them if they or other more suitable persons were willing
to participate in the study, on behalf of their organiza-
tion. Hence, it was up to the contact person to choose
the most suitable respondent, given that the survey
involved procurement and project management pro-
cesses. Only four people declined to participate at this
stage, owing to lack of time, so a paper version of the
survey was then sent out by mail to the 100 people that
had agreed to participate. These people were mostly
procurement managers, project managers or directors
of the construction and facilities department in their
organizations. After two reminders, a total of 87
responses were received, representing a response rate
of 84% of the total sample size.
Measure: procurement procedures
The survey concerns different aspects of the organiza-
tions’ procurement procedures. It was first piloted by
five respondents, resulting in only minor changes. In
the final version the respondents were asked how often
they used different procurement procedures, measured
by seven-point Likert scales (e.g. to what extent do you
use reimbursement compensation including cost incen-
tives? 15very seldom and 75very often). The excep-
tion to this is the question regarding task-related
attributes in bid evaluation, in which the importance
of the attributes was estimated (15unimportant and
75very important) in order to better assess their
relative impact on bid evaluation results.
Multivariate analysis
The data were computed into the statistical package of
social science (SPSS). For conducting structural
equation modelling (SEM) we used an additional
SPSS package called AMOS (analysis of moment
structures). SEM is a multivariate technique used to
estimate a series of interrelated dependent relationships
simultaneously (Hair et al., 1998). It has been applied
in construction management contexts before, for
example by Wong and Cheung (2005). They argue
that it is appropriate when interrelationships of
different hypotheses are investigated in a holistic
manner, such as in the modelling of how different
trust attributes affect partnering success (Wong and
Cheung, 2005). Like these authors, we utilize SEM to
produce an accurate representation of the overall
results, which in our model means an investigation of
how different elements of procurement procedures are
interconnected and together facilitate the establishment
of trust and cooperation (see Table 3). In this study
SEM also provides a factor structure, giving informa-
tion about how well each latent construct is reflected by
the suggested items (Hair et al., 1998) (see Table 2).
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Results and analysis
In Table 1 we report the respondents’ mean ratings (M)
and standard deviations (SD) on items regarding early
contractor involvement, incentive-based compensation,
limited bid invitation, task-related attributes, coopera-
tion and trust.
In order to investigate the suitability of the items
measuring the constructs in Table 1, a factor analysis
was conducted in AMOS. Table 2 reports the unstan-
dardized and standardized factor estimates of each
item. The factor scores prove that 18 out of 23 scores
have an estimate that exceeds a 0.5 cut-off point. The
measurement estimate on each latent construct is
reported, since future studies may benefit from this
information. The results suggest that the 18 items with
satisfactory scores may be considered appropriate
measures of their latent constructs, while the remaining
five items need to be further developed in future
research. This is further discussed in the conclusions.
To investigate the relationships between the different
constructs (Table 1) proposed in the model (Figure 1),
a SEM analysis was conducted. The overall model
receives only limited support if considering that
IFI50.8 (see Table 3). According to the rule of thumb,
IFI should exceed 0.9 and in exploratory analysis a 0.8
level. More importantly, however, the most conserva-
tive criterion, chi-square divided by degrees of freedom,
proves an almost perfect fit (x2/d.f.53.50), despite the
relatively small sample size. As a rule of thumb, models
having a x2/d.f. of more than five may be considered
poor and less than two as over-fitted (Hair et al., 1998).
This means that the overall model of the proposed
cooperative procurement procedures fits our data.
Hence, it seems that clients involving contractors early
in specification adopt a system perspective on their
Table 1 Descriptive summary of summated scales
Definition Item M SD
Early contractor involvement To what extent specification is…
Integrated design and construction
through early involvement of contractors
in design–build contracts or joint
specification
Specified by contractor (design–build contracts) 3.01 1.85
Joint specification (client, consultants and contractors
work together with design)
2.76 1.75
Incentive-based compensation To what extent contractors are compensated by…
Reimbursement compensation coupled
with shared rewards (and risks)
connected to a target price
Incentive-based reimbursement (A gain/pain sharing
approach)
1.99 1.19
Bonus-based reimbursement (A gain sharing
approach)
1.67 1.2
Limited bid invitation To what extent bidding process is executed by…
A limited number of contractors are
nvited to bid
Slightly limited invitation (5–10 bidders) 3.64 2.32
Strongly limited invitation (2–4 bidders) 3.09 2.24
Direct negotiation (only one bidder) 1.98 1.36
Task-related attributes Importance of task related attributes
Partner selection through careful
assessment of contractors’ task-related
attributes in bid evaluation
Earlier experiences of contractor 4.81 1.74
Contractor’s quality and environmental management
systems
4.24 1.43
Contractor’s project staff and labour 5.14 1.49
Contractor’s financial record 4.67 1.39
Contractor’s attitudes towards change 4.54 1.76
Contractor’s references 4.80 1.59
Contractor’s cooperative skills 5.08 1.82
Contractor’s technical skills 5.46 1.53
Cooperation To what extent do the following parts of cooperation occur
Cooperation is based on sharing goals,
information, operations and
interpersonal teambuilding
Joint objectives 3.29 1.96
Policy for conflict solution 1.90 1.18
Shared information in shared IT-database 3.01 1.98
Shared coordination office to operate from 1.99 1.37
Teambuilding activities 3.25 2.01
Trust To what extent monitoring of performance is …
Client’s trust in contractor’s self-control Process control by client (reversed code) 2.49 1.85
Process control by contractor 4.44 2.2
Limited random output control by client 2.56 1.75
Procurement effects on cooperation 897
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procurement procedures, adapting them in their
entirety to facilitate more cooperative relationships.
This result is quite different from earlier research.
Cheung et al. (2001) argue that there is a need for a
more objective and systematic selection model, since
construction procurement decisions are often judg-
mental and subject to biases of the decision maker. Our
results, on the contrary, show that such a model
regarding a systematic view on cooperative procure-
ment procedures is evident.
The individual hypotheses in the model also show
some interesting results if focusing on the standardized
estimates (presented in brackets) and level of signifi-
cance (p,0.05) (see Table 3). Unexpectedly, early
contractor involvement in specification does not have a
significant positive effect (+0.48) on incentive-based
Table 2 Factor analysis measurements
Item Estimate (Standardized)
Early inv Inc comp LBI Task attr Coop Trust P
Early contractor involvement
Item 1 0.47 (0.32) 0.029
Item 2 1 (0.73) N/A
Incentive-based compensation
Item 1 1 (0.56) N/A
Item 2 1.73 (0.97) 0.003
Limited bid invitation (LBI)
Item 1 0.73 (0.47) 0.000
Item 2 1 (0.68) N/A
Item 3 0.66 (0.73) 0.000
Task-related attributes
Item 1 1 (0.56) N/A
Item 2 0.85 (0.58) 0.000
Item 3 1.08 (0.71) 0.000
Item 4 0.74 (0.52) 0.000
Item 5 1.28 (0.70) 0.000
Item 6 1.17 (0.72) 0.000
Item 7 1.61 (0.86) 0.000
Item 8 1.21 (0.77) 0.000
Cooperation
Item 1 1. (0.70) N/A
Item 2 0.59 (0.69) 0.000
Item 3 0.67 (0.46) 0.000
Item 4 0.48 (0.48) 0.000
Item 5 1.02 (0.70) 0.000
Trust
Item 1 1.07 (0.75) 0.004
Item 2 1 (0.59) N/A
Item 3 0.49 (0.36) 0.014
Table 3 Test of model and hypotheses
Item Estimate (Standardized) Decision
confirmed if
p,0.05
Prop. Effect Inc Comp LBI Task attr Coop Trust p
H1 Early inv + 0.25 (48) 0.088 Rejected
H2 Early inv + 0.47 (0.40) 0.082 Rejected
H3 Inc Comp + 0.495 (0.37) 0.010 Confirmed
H4 LBI + 0.192 (0.32) 0.028 Confirmed
H5 Task attr + 0.723 (0.491) 0.001 Confirmed
H6 Task attr + 0.029 (0.02) 0.88 Rejected
Note: Model Fit: x25885.861, d.f.5253, p50.000, IFI50.80, x2/d.f.53.501.
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compensation (Hypothesis 1), nor (+0.4) on limited bid
invitation (Hypothesis 2). This may indicate that many
clients still perform a traditional competitive approach
entailing open bid procedures and fixed price compen-
sation when involving contractors in specification. Since
many of the respondents represent public clients, for
whom limited bid invitations are restricted, the rejection
of Hypothesis 2 is not a surprise. Fixed price compensa-
tion is however not stipulated by law, for which reason
the rejection of Hypothesis 1 cannot be explained by
such an argument. As anticipated, we found that both
incentive-based compensation (Hypothesis 3) (+0.37)
and limited bid invitation (Hypothesis 4) have signifi-
cant positive effects on task-related partner attributes
(+0.32). This indicates that clients’ partner selection is
highly dependent on their earlier choices regarding type
of compensation and bid invitation. Desirable task-
related partner attributes (Hypothesis 5) also have a
strong positive significant effect on cooperation (0.491),
as predicted. This is in line with earlier research, which
has found that careful partner selection forms a proper
basis for cooperation to emerge both in a general
industry context (Heide and John, 1990; Stump and
Heide, 1996) and in construction (Brown et al., 2001).
Unexpectedly, task-related attributes (Hypothesis 6)
have only a weak and not significant positive effect on
trust in contractor’s self-control (+0.02). The rejection
of Hypothesis 6 may be due to trust being harder and
taking more time to establish than cooperation. It
requires a cultural change, which may be facilitated by
a widespread long-term use of cooperative procurement
procedures. To summarize Table 3: the overall model
was supported, the individual hypotheses Hypothesis 1,
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 6 were rejected, while
Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 were
confirmed.
Conclusions
This paper offers three contributions that are important
to consider in the context of construction procurement.
The first conclusion considers the overall procurement
process, which relates to the model and how the order
of the procurement procedures is formed. The second
contribution considers the isolated hypotheses in the
model, regarding interconnections between individual
procedures. Finally, we discuss the measurements and
how future research may benefit from them.
Starting with the overall model, it confirms that
clients’ desire to involve contractors in specification
triggers them to perform cooperative procurement
procedures. We can now verify that clients are
bound by the chosen specification procedure in their
subsequent decisions regarding compensation, bid
invitation and partner selection, in order to facilitate
trust and cooperation with contractors. This systematic
view on procurement is quite different from earlier
research results, which have found that construction
procurement decisions are often judgmental and
subject to biases of the decision-maker.
When looking at the individual hypotheses, we did
not find any support for the first two hypotheses. Early
involvement in specification and its relations to
compensation and bid invitation were both insignif-
icant, which may indicate that many clients still
perform open bid procedures and fixed price compen-
sation when involving contractors in specification. An
additional contribution to the rejection of Hypothesis 1
and Hypothesis 2 is that the measure of early contractor
involvement reports somewhat weak internal reliability
(discussed below). On the positive side, we found
support for the idea that partner selection based on
task-related attributes is positively influenced by both
incentive-based compensation and limited bid invita-
tion, supporting Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4.
Furthermore, the model confirms that clients perform-
ing such a partner selection are more likely to establish
cooperation than trust in their relationships with
contractors, supporting Hypothesis 5 but rejecting
Hypothesis 6. Hence, it confirms that the extent of
cooperation is highly dependent on a partner selection
based on task-related attributes, which is in line with
earlier research. The rejection of Hypothesis 6 may be
because the establishment of trust requires not only a
short-term change of procurement procedures in a
specific project but also a long-term cultural change.
Finally, we reported that 18 out of 23 items proved a
satisfying loading to their constructs regarding com-
pensation, invitation, task attributes and cooperation,
despite the relatively small sample size. We believe it is
important to report also the weak results in order to
develop better future instruments. Starting with the
specification construct, which is mediated by the
others, it plays an important role in how cooperation
is formed in the construction industry. As aforemen-
tioned, the construct in itself reports weak internal
reliability if focusing on factor estimates, and addition-
ally it has a limited isolated effect on the subsequent
constructs in the model (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis
2). Future research should thus focus on more details
of the specification process (a better construct) or,
given a larger sample, test if client, contractor or joint
specification treated as different groups, have moderat-
ing effects on this kind of model. Next, the construct of
trust in contractor’s self-control may also benefit from a
more fine-grained instrument consisting of a larger
number of suitable items. Another interesting idea for
future research would be to investigate the procured
Procurement effects on cooperation 899
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parties’ opinions regarding different procurement
procedures’ effects on cooperation. Since this study
has a pure client perspective, we cannot compare their
responses with those of the contractors.
Practical implications
The results imply that clients planning to implement
cooperative relationships need to reassess their entire
procurement process. Our model has verified that early
involvement of contractors, limited bid invitation,
incentive-based compensation and task-related attributes
together affect trust and cooperation in client–contractor
relationships. Therefore, partnering approaches based on
only one or two of these procedures (e.g. incentive-based
compensation) are not suitable. Furthermore, partnering
initiated in the construction stage, based on the client’s
fixed design, may not be suitable since cooperative
procurement procedures are triggered by clients’ desire
to integrate design and construction through early
involvement of contractors in specification.
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